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THE DEVICE OF FICTION IN PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW
Jean J. A. Salmon*
"Sharpers, this tale's for you! Beware,
Or life may teach you as she taught him."
(The Fox and the Stork)
La Fontaine, Fables, Book 1, Fable XVIII
I. INTRODUCTION
Claude Du Pasquierl referred to fictions as "the most artificial device
of legal technique. Fictions hold as legally true that which is false; their
reasoning is based on an imaginary and therefore fictive situation." Paul
Roubier2 emphasizes that "Fiction represents a direct assault on that
which seems natural, deliberately distorting the truth in order to impose
the desired solutions."
We submit, in other words, that a fiction is a device of legal technique
by which a situation is characterized in a manner contrary to reality in
order to ascribe to it the legal consequences which flow from such
characterization.
Before examining how this device is used in public international law,
it is necessary to clarify several points. The fictional device implies that
there exists an authority able to create it. What kind of authority in
* Professor i I'Universit6 de Bruselles.
The present paper was presented in French to the Centre National de Recherches de Logique in
Brussels in 1973. The French version will be published by Prof. Perelman in conjunction with other
papers in LA FICTION EN DROTI, and has already appeared as a separate article. See Salmon, Le
procede de la fiction en droit internationale, REVUE BELGE DE DROIT INTERNATIONLE 11 (1974).
The editors wish to express their appreciation to Mr. Joseph Toochin for his translation of the
article.
'DELACHAUX ET NIESTLE, INTRODUCTION A LA THEORIE GENERALE ET A LA PHILOSOPHIE DU
DROIT (3e ed. 1948) at 167.
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public international law can do so, and at what stage in the rule-making
process does the fictional device come into play?
In municipal law fictions are categorized, according to the body from
which they emanate, as statutory, judicial or judge-made, and doctrinal
fictions. Are such distinctions equally applicable in public international
law?
It is hardly advisable to transpose these categories to international
law since this would imply that there is an analogy between the two
systems of law. Thus, while it would be possible to speak of a doctrine
in international law, the same would not be possible for statutory and
judge-made law since the concept of a legislator is non-existent and the
term 'judge-made law' does not have the same meaning and amplitude
in public international law.
In international law there are no legislators whose wills are imposed
on the States. There simply exist agreements between the subjects of
international law, the states, in order to establish between themselves
binding rules, provided they have participated in the elaboration of these
rules of conduct, whether customary or treaty law, or have subsequently
given them their consent.
The agreement may enjoy varying degrees of acceptance but it is
seldom granted the universal application which is characteristic of legis-
lative action; rarely do States universally agree to establish norms. In
the 19th and early 20th Centuries an apparent unanimity in interna-
tional law merely concealed an agreement between the large European
powers whose imperialism left to the smaller and less powerful states
no choice other than join the greater powers more or less spontaneously,
or otherwise to be rejected by them as being barbaric or uncivilized.
Such a view can no longer be maintained today. The system of creat-
ing norms is very decentralized, individualized and full of relativity. All
levels of generality are to be found in practice, from bilateral to quasi-
universal.'
Decentralization and relativity are on one hand, consequences of the
division of the world into sovereign states, and on the other hand, are
the result of differing political, economic and social systems. It follows
(hen, that in public international law, fiction is the work of those who
make the rules, that is, not of legislators but of the states who are parties
to the agreement.
:'See Chaumont, Cours gneral de droit international public, 129 RECUEIL DES COURS DE LA
HAYE 332, 417 et seq. (1970); see also Salmon, La r'gle de droit en driot internationale public in
Perelnan, La rgle de droit, 193 (197 1).
Id. at 202.
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Jurisprudence, likewise, does not have the same meaning in public
international law, where the judicial role is minimal' and moreover,
overrated.' Application and interpretation of the rules of international
law falls mainly within the purview of the State's customary practice;
States rarely rely for such important matter on international judges.
Legal doctrine, however, plays a significant role in the organization
of the law and the spirit. We shall return to this subject below.
Clearly, a fiction may be created at the time of the elaboration or the
creation of a rule of law, for example, in a treaty between states. Fiction
may also be introduced while interpreting or applying a rule of law, so
that in actual practice states may characterize situations in a manner
that is contrary to reality. Examples of such situations will be discussed
below. Interpretations or applications of this nature may even be contra
legem and represent a violation of law hidden by the fictional device. If
this violation of the rule through use of a fiction is repeated, fiction then
becomes a device not only for extending the rule of law but also for its
extinction, the contrary practice causing the actual rule to fall into
desuetude.
As for doctrine, it is responsible for fictions introduced when rules,
constructions and abstractions are organized with no connection with
reality. Such abstractions are, in fact, closely akin to the ideology of the
ruling classes.
In the following pages we shall examine fictions, whatever their creat-
ing source, as well as the actual time of their application. In addition,
we shall attempt to determine the functions of this device. Nevertheless,
instead of classifying fictions in international law in terms of the author-
ity creating them or of the time of their application, it is more revealing
to classify them according to their aims and functions, which leads us
to submit the following two distinctions:
A. Fictions as technical legal devices
1) Some fictions strive towards simplification. False characterization
is used as a legalistic shortcut in order to facilitate the description of
the rule of law.
2) Other fictions are the consequence of a lack of imagination, as when
a jurist uses concepts which are inappropriate, but nevertheless conven-
ient, because they are familiar. The false characterization is used be-
51d. at 195.
6See Salmon, Commentaries, INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON THE JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF
INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES, (Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International
Law, July 10-12, 1972; in press).
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cause of a fear of the new or because of tradition, to explain the rule of
law.
3) Still other fictions are used to set aside the application of express
provisions or to broaden the interpretation of terms in a given situation.
B. Fictions as a reflection of an ideology
I) The most obvious examples arise from the fact that international law
does not regulate the consequences which States must draw from reality.
States use false characterizations in the exercise of their sovereign pow-
ers which allow them to weight or even to deny reality.
2) Other fictions are created because the States dare neither to recognize
the truth nor to express it. The false characterization then, is used as a
form of courtesy or hypocrisy (the former is never more than a manifes-
tation of the latter) in order to hide the truth.
3) Still other fictions flow from theories established by legal doctrine,
that is, legal formalism. False characterizations are used to systematize,
rationalize or organize but with the effect of justifying results for the
benefit of special class interests.
The only purpose of the distinctions made here is for the sake of
clarity. In fact, fictions of different types are not necessarily mutually
exclusive-quite the contrary. On many occasions there is a multiple
effect. Thus, a fiction which may be described as legalistic-arising
from purely legal technique-will frequently have ideological aims, as
we shall see below.
II. FICTIONS AS A DEVICE OF LEGAL TECHNIQUE
A. Fictions for simplification purposes. The false characterization is
used as a legalistic shortcut in order to facilitate the description of the
rule of law.
This method is found in the terms of international treaties as well as
in the provisions of national laws relative to international law. It can
occur in two forms: As a deliberate insertion of a fact into a category
which it does not belong, to insure that the fact will be accorded treat-
ment of the category: As a deliberate exclusion of a fact from the
category to which it corresponds, to insure that it will be treated differ-
ently.
I. Fiction by deliberate insertion into a category
The following demonstrate the first form:
-Article 3 of the Treaty of Washington of February 6, 1922,1 relating
7Limitation of Naval Armament, Feb. 6, 1922, Art. III, 43 Stat. 1655, (1923), T.S. No. 671.
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to the use of submarines and noxious gases in warfare provides:
. . . any person in the service of any Power who shall violate any of
these rules . . . shall be deemed to have violated the laws of war and
shall be liable to trial and punishment as if for an act of piracy.
Even if the two situations can be considered in any way analogous - as
at the point of disapproval of the act - it is clear that they do not
correspond to the same definition. Thus, to assimilate one category into
another constitutes a fiction.
-Article 4 of the Convention of May 18, 1956 between Belgium and
the Federal Republic of Germany concerning the creation of juxtaposed
national customs centers, etc., states:
Statutory and regulatory prescriptions of the country bordering, rela-
tive to inspections, are applicable in the zone, . . . such as they are
applicable in the district to be specified for this purpose by the govern-
ment of said country. Any infractions to said prescriptions committed
in the territory of the host country, are committed in the territory of
the bordering country within this district.
In the same vein, we also note the Royal Decrees relative to the creation
of juxtaposed national customs centers on the borders, implementing
the Conventions of the type cited above.
-Article 5 of the Agreement of September 6, 1957 between Belgium
and France relative to mining along the borders and covering a number
of other legal relationships, provides that the law of the state to which
the coal is brought on the surface shall be applied even if the coal was
extracted beyond the borders of that state.8
Fictions of this type are often drafted into the definition sections in
either the beginning or final clauses of a treaty. Thus, certain clauses
known as territorial or colonial, such as Article 1, 3, b) i) of the North-
East Atlantic Fisheries Convention, signed at London on January 24,
1959, provides:
For the purposes of this Convention . . . b) the expression "territo-
ries" in relation to any contracting State, extends to, i) any territory
within or adjacent to the Convention area for whose international
relations the Contracting State is responsible; . . .
-Article 23 of the Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in
Persons and of the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others, open for
signature at Lake Success, New York on March 21, 1950 states:
Moniteur beige, Sept 9, 1959.
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For the purposes of the present Convention the word "State" shall
include all the colonies and Trust territories of a State signatory or
acceding to the Convention, and all territories for which such State is
internationally responsible.
One immediately notes that the two preceeding examples also contain
ideological aspects. The amalgamation of "Territory" of the colonizing
"State" with that of the colonized Territory is a confusion which has
been in existence for a long time and which continues to exist, as evi-
denced by Portugal's continued references to its "African Provinces."
-Article 73, Paragraph 1 of the Belgian Law of June 5, 1928, revising
the disciplinary and penal code relative to the merchant marine and
fishing stipulates that "any infraction committed on board a Belgian
vessel is held to be committed in the Territory of the Kingdom of
Belgium."
In all the examples cited in the preceeding paragraph, the fiction
consisted of characterizing A, a situation contrary to fact, as a situation
B, in order to have situation A governed by the legal status of B.
2. Fiction by deliberate exclusion from a category
In this case the legalistic device works in the opposite manner, the
idea being to exclude a fact from a category which should govern it in
order that it be treated as though belonging to another category. The
so-called attempt clause ("clause d'atentat") provides a typical exam-
ple. For instance, Article 3 of the Extradition Treaty of August 15,
1874, between Belgium and France, provides:
It is expressly stipulated that the foreigner on whom extradition is
granted shall not be tried or sentenced for any political offense com-
mitted prior to the extradition nor for any fact connected with a similar
offense.
An attempt against the person of a head of a foreign State or against
any member of his family when such attempt shall constitute the fact
either of murder, assassination or poisoning, shall not be deemed to
be a political offense, nor a fact connected with a similar offense,
The fiction is obvious. An attempt against a head of a State is a prime
political crime, which makes the fiction all the more striking. It would
have been possible to achieve the same result simply by providing an
exception to the rule. However, in this instance the fictional device also
has an ideological function. In the liberal and individualistic bourgeois
civilization, political crime had acquired a certain favorable connotation
(romantic heroes, etc.). Thus, in order to deprive individuals committing
such crimes of that favorable connotation it was stated that such crimes
[Vol. 4:2
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were not political. An exception to the rule would not have the same
ideological effect.
B. Fictions as a consequence of a lack of imagination by the jurist
who utilizes concepts which, while inadequate, are convenient to use
since they are known to him. The false characterization is used to ex-
plain the rule either because of fear of innovation or because of
tradition.
The clearest example of this is the doctrine of "exterritoriality" or
"extraterritoriality" which has been applied to embassy premises, resi-
dences of the heads of missions and even to the diplomats themselves.
To the extent that the scope of the doctrine is limited to the idea that
embassy premises and residences of the heads of missions are consid-
ered, through fiction, to be parcels of territory belonging to the ac-
credited State, such doctrine has been demonstrated to be false on many
occasions, not only by definition but also by its total inability to compre-
hend all that is covered by the modern doctrine of immunity.
Let us review briefly some of the critical arguments against this con-
cept:
- it does not explain the immunity of officials when they are away
from the buildings;
- it does not explain certain special limitations on the immunities of
officials while away from the premises, such as limitations on matters
relating to taxation, civil and criminal jurisdiction, etc.; - it does not
explain the fact that inviolability implies not only the duty to abstain
but also the obligation on the part of the accrediting State to protect;
- above all, national jurisprudence and the practices of national execu-
tive and legislative bodies recognize that the acts occurring on the em-
bassy premises or within the residences of the heads of missions are, for
all practical purposes, acts taking place in the territory of the accredit-
ing State. We refer here to cases involving crimes and offenses, domicile
of officials, application of the law on war reparations or laws relating
to city planning and construction permits, nationality of the children of
diplomatic officials, acts concerning adoption, marriage, private agree-
ments, etc. Despite the fact that this concept is wholly improper and has
been discredited since the turn of the century, it is still to be found both
in court decisions and in text books. Hopefully, the Vienna Conventions
of 1961 and 19631 on diplomatic and consular relations which com-
'Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, open for signature April 18, 1961, 500 U.N.T.S.
96. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, done April 24, 1963, 596 U.N.T.S. 261.
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pletely excluded this concept, will impose that of immunity, which is
much more flexible and is better suited to explain the privileged status
of diplomats.
The doctrine of exterritoriality has also been used with the same
inefficiency to explain the immunities granted to foreign heads of States,
to the Pope, and to troops stationed on foreign territory. This fiction,
which is used because of mental laziness and lack of imagination, ap-
pears to be completely outdated and should be replaced by the concept
of immunity, which is far more flexible and versatile.
The doctrine of exterritoriality has also been advanced to explain the
legal status of ships on the high seas. It was maintained that they were
floating islands of the country whose flag they flew. Belgian decisions,
in particular, uphold this theory.
Thus, the Court of Appeals of Ghent rendered the following opinion
on February 12, 1883, in which it stated:
Be it known that all Belgian ships on the high seas must be considered
as a portion of the territory of the Kingdom, and that Belgian Courts
have jurisdiction with regard to the offenses committed thereon even
by foreigners.' 0
In the famous case of the S.S. Lotus, the Permanent Court of Inter-
national Justice upheld the same idea, stating:
A corollary of the principle of the freedom of the seas is that a ship
on the hjgh seas is assimilated to the territory of the State the flag of
which it flies, for just as in its own territory, that State exercises its
authority upon it, and no other State may do so. All that can be said
is that by virtue of the principle of the freedom of the seas, a ship is
placed in the same position as national territory; .. .It follows that
what occurs on board a vessel on the high seas must be regarded as if
it occurred on the territory of the State whose flag the ship flies...
there is no rule of international law prohibiting the State to which the
ship on which the effects of the offense have taken place belongs, from
regarding the offense as having been committed in its territory and
prosecuting, accordingly, the delinquent."
In his dissenting opinion, Lord Finlay demonstrated the fictive aspect
of this assimilation and stated:
A ship is a movable chattel, it is not a place; when on a voyage it shifts
'"Belgique judiciare (B.J.) 510 [18831. See also Brussels, May 24, 1856, B.J. 1421 [18571; Ghent,
Feb. 2, 1883, B.J. 510 [1883]; Corr. Antwerp, Jan. 26, 1905, Pandectes periodiques No. 97 [19061;
Corr. Antwerp, June 15, 1910, B.J. 251 [1911].
"Case of the S.S. "Lotus," [1927] P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 9 at 25.
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its place from day to day and from hour to hour, and when in dock it
is a chattel which happens at the time to be in a particular place. The
jurisdiction over crimes committed on a ship at sea is not of a terri-
torial nature at all. It depends upon the law which for convenience and
by common consent is applied to the case of chattels of such a very
special nature as ships. It appears to me to be impossible with any
reason to apply the principle of locality to the case of ships coming
into collision .... 12
We know that the Lotus case, decided because of an even split in the
voting by the vote of the Presiding Justice, was severely criticized. A
solution opposite to that of the Lotus case, on exclusive jurisdiction of
the flagstate, was finally adopted at the International Convention of
May 10, 1952," for the unification of certain rules relating to criminal
jurisdiction in collision matters.
The Judiciary Committee of the Privy Council has shown the defi-
ciencies of the fiction of exterritoriality as it applies to ships in the oft-
cited language of the case of Chung Chi Cheung v. Rex: 4
Their Lordships have no hesitation in rejecting the doctrine of exterri-
toriality expressed in the words of Mr. Oppenheim, which regards the
public ship "as a floating portion of the flagstate." However the doc-
trine of exterritoriality is expressed, it is a fiction, and legal fictions
have a tendency to pass beyond their appointed bounds and to harden
into dangerous facts. The truth is that the enunciators of the floating
island theory have failed to face very obvious possibilities that make
the doctrine quite impracticable when tested by the actualities of life
on board a ship and ashore.
Once again the fiction does not fully explain the complicated situation
of the legal status of ships at sea. This rivalry of jurisdiction between
the flagstate and other states varies according to the different elements,
such as: the location of the vessel (interior waterways, territorial waters,
contiguous zone, high seas), the type of vessel (private or state-owned,
and in the latter case, either military or commercial, although the non-
Socialist States do not recognize the distinction); the type of jurisdiction
(customs health, fiscal, criminal, civil, etc.). The Geneva Conventions
on the Law of the Sea of April 29, 195811 propose very different solu-
tions with provisions expressed in the form of wishes, voluntary absten-
'11d. at 53.
"International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to Penal Jurisdiction
in Matters of Collisions, open for signature, May 10, 1952, 429 U.N.T.S. 233.
"[1939] A.C. 160.
"Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, Apr. 29, 1958, [19641 2 U.S.T.
1607. T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 206.
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tions out of courtesy and straight immunities for state-owned vessels.
The doctrine of exterritoriality has equally been applied to aircraft
and one finds mutatis mutandis the same problems affecting its applica-
tion to ships. 6
National laws are most often limited to the type of fictions analyzed
in Section I infra. Thus, Article 36 of the Belgian Law of June 27, 1937
states:
Offenses committed on board Belgian aircraft while in flight are
deemed to be committed in Belgium and may be prosecuted even if the
accused is not found in the territory of the Kingdom of Belgium . . .
Articles 6 to 13 of the Law of April 17, 1878, setting forth the prelimi-
nary section of the Code of Penal Procedure apply to offenses commit-
ted aboard a foreign aircraft while in flight as though the fact occurred
outside the territory of the Kingdom of Belgium.
Article 7 of the Law of June 27, 1937 states:
Births taking place aboard Belgian aircraft while in flight are deemed
to have occurred in the territory of the Kingdom of Belgium.
The same provisions apply regarding deaths. In all the examples given
in this second section the fiction consists of utilizing an ancient legal
category and applying it to a new situation. Exterritoriality is the type
of concept which has proved to be inadequate and transitory and moreo-
ver, one does not dare to pursue this fiction to its logical extremes.
Should a vessel actually be considered in law as a floating island of its
flagstate its status would in fact be that of an island, that is, it would
have sovereignty over the land beneath it and the air space above, as
well as over the territorial waters surrounding it. Such extravagant views
have never been advocated. Creation of a new concept (immunity) or
using several concepts will enable one to give more precise legal status
to a new situation.
On the other hand, there are concepts which are quite easily extended.
Such is the case of the concept of a "legal person," which, after having
been applied to the state, has been extended to international organiza-
tions. This is equally true of the concept of "nationality" which origi-
nally was intended for individuals and has been extended with little
difficulty to legal persons, ships and aircraft so that almost no one
notices the original fiction.
"See generallyv Cheng, Analogies and Fictions in Air and Space Law, 21 CURRENT LEGAL PROB.
137 (1968).
"Law of June 27, 1937, art. 7 bis.
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C. Fictions which have been developed in order to set aside the appli-
cation of a rule of law or to broaden the interpretation of its terms.
During the 18th Century and at the beginning of the 19th Century,
the naval powers regularly used the blockade as an act of war. This act
consisted of surrounding a port or a part of the coast with permanent
naval forces in order to prevent all outside communications by sea. The
blockade was effected simply by cruising along the portion of the coast
(blockade by cruising).
A practice subsequently developed became known as a "cabinet
blockade," "paper blockade," or "fictive blockade." The powers were
satisfied merely to announce the blockade without effectively assuring
it. This form of abusive practice was vividly criticized and the Declara-
tion of April 16, 1856 put an end to its use. Article 4 provided that:
Blockades in order to be binding must be effective, that is to say,
maintained by a force sufficient really to prevent access to the coast
of the enemy coast.'8
In fact, the purpose of the fiction was to free oneself from complying
with an indispensable condition, as far as the application of the rule was
concerned.
The practice of international organizations frequently ended up with
the same type of situation. For example, to be validly taken the deci-
sions of the Assembly and the Council of the League of Nations re-
quired a unanimous vote. Article 5 section 1 of the Covenant states:
Except where otherwise expressly provided in this Covenant or by the
terms of the present Treaty, decisions at any meeting at the Assembly
or of the Council shall require the agreement of all the Members of
the League represented at the meeting.
In order to soften this rule, it became a practice to consider abstentions
as not affecting the unanimous nature of a vote; the result of this prac-
tice was to set aside the application of a strict rule by means of a fictive
unanimity. Likewise, the United Nations used the same device regard-
ing abstentions in the Security Council, despite explicit provisions of the
Charter. Article 27 section 3 states:
Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters shall be made
by an affirmative vote of nine members including the concurring votes
of the permanent members.
In no case may an abstention be assimilated to an affirmative vote. Such
"See A. Ghozland, La fiction en droit international 1921 at 55 et seq. (unpublished thesis in
Librarie g6n6rale de droit et de jurisprudence, Paris).
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practice is therefore contra legem, but nevertheless is accepted without
objection."
Another famous example is found in the 19th Session of the General
Assembly. According to the interpretation of the facts as given by the
United States and its supporters, by virtue of Article 19 of the Charter,
several states, including France and the Socialist States, should auto-
matically have lost their right to vote in the General Assembly after
failing to pay their share of the United Nations budget.
In order to avoid having to face the difficult question which would
have arisen had a vote been required, a procedure was developed during
the Session which substituted a consensus for a vote; thus, decisions
could be made without a vote so long as there were no objections. On
February 18, 1965 this fiction reached its culminating point after Al-
bania forced a procedural vote on whether or not the Assembly would
continue its work without voting. The United States thereupon made it
known that it would not consider such vote as jeopardizing the applica-
tion of Article 19 of the Charter. The Assembly voted to continue not
to vote and that its vote was not a vote, thus in actuality setting aside
the application of Article 19.20
We have shown elsewhere"' that States may set aside the application
of a provision by arguing that there is a legal vacuum. Specifically, at
the General Conference of UNESCO, in 1962, there was a question as
to whether a decision on the project to salvage the monuments of Nubia
was to be taken by a simple majority vote or by a two-thirds majority
vote. The project involved raising funds through a borrowing by the
organization. According to Article IVC section 8 of the Constitution of
the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
(UNESCO),
Decisions shall be made by a simple majority except in cases in which
a two-thirds majority is required by this Constitution.
Neither the Constitution nor the rules of procedure of the General
Conference required that the resolution in question be adopted by a two-
thirds majority vote and it therefore should have been adopted by a
simple majority vote. Nevertheless, the magnitude of the projected un-
'"U.N. CHARTER art. 27, § 3. The situation is different with regard to absences; on this point the
U.S.S.R. considered that the Resolutions adopted by the Security Council while it was absent
during the Korean War were illegal.
2
"For more information on the question see Salmon and Ismets, La criseflnanci'reet constituti-
onelle de I'ONU devant la XlXbsession de I'Assemblke Bnbrale, 73 SOCIALISME (1966).
2 Salmon, Quelques observations sur les lacunes de droit international public, 1967 REVUE BELGE
DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 440.
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dertaking prompted the French representative to argue to the Legal
Committee that the drafters of the Articles of Organization and the
Statutes had never envisioned such a situation. He claimed they were
facing a legal vacuum which, by analogy, called for the application of
Article 18 of the United Nations Charter which stipulates that decisions
on important questions are taken by a two-thirds majority vote.
Even though the Constitution of Organization of UNESCO con-
tained rules similar to Article 18 of the United Nations Charter, the
French thesis of a legal vacuum was adopted by the General Conference.
This thesis was nothing more than fiction. It was a screen with obvious
political ends, aimed at setting aside a patent provision in the Constitu-
tion of UNESCO. The creation of a legal vacuum and filling it immedi-
ately with another rule allowed the application of law to be set aside in
favor of a newly created rule.
Another kind of fiction consists in the strict observance of legal for-
malities, which gives the impression of following the law, while at the
same time breaching it in spirit. A good example of this is seen in the
entry of sixteen states into the United Nations on the 13th and 14th of
December 1955, after a five-year period during which all admissions
were blocked. The Western States objected to the admission of Albania,
Bulgaria, Hungary, Mongolia and Rumania. The Soviet Union count-
ered with a veto in the Council on the admission of the other dozen
candidates. For the sake of universality, the Soviet Union had proposed
the admission of all states as a single block. However, when consulted
on this procedure, the opinion of the International Court of Justice was
that each candidate had to be reviewed separately and that it was impro-
per to subject an affirmative vote for the admission of one state for the
simultaneous admission of the other states.12
Nevertheless, in spite of the separate votes cast, it was, in fact, an
admission of a single block of sixteen states with Japan and Mongolia
postponed.23 Thus, although all the formalities were observed, faithful-
ness to the letter of the law was a mere sham since at the very root the
principle of a block admission won the day.
2
'Advisory opinion on conditions of admission of a State to membership in the U.N. [19481 I.C.J.
57.
2"See 12 U.N. REV. 11-13 (1965).
1974]
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
IllI. FICTIONS AS IDEOLOGICAL REFLECTIONS
A. Fictions arising from the fact that international law does not
regulate the consequences which the States may draw from reality.
False characterizations are used by the States in the exercise of their
sovereign powers to deny reality.
Some discussion of the general theory of recognition will be useful
here. In the present state of international law, since the states are sover-
eign, there is no obligation to "recognize" certain facts, states or situa-
tions. Since recognition is a free act of the states, they can either refuse
to recognize reality and deny its existence or recognize that which is not
real and consider that it exists.
I. Refusal to recognize reality
There are many examples of this type of situation. With regard to
States, Israel is not recognized by the Arab States, and the Democratic
Republic of Germany and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam have
not until very recently been recognized by the western nations and their
third-world allies. Certain states still refuse to recognize Bangla-Desh
and the Democratic Republic of Korea. In such case the unrecognized
state is labelled an entity. A famous example with regard to govern-
ments is that of the People's Republic of China. It took over twenty
years for the western nations and their allies to recognize that govern-
ment, beating the previous record set by the length of time it took to
draw the government of the USSR from a similar limbo. The same may
be said with regard to other situations, a prime example being the lack
of technical recognition accorded the Oder-Neisse border.
Of course, in all these examples it would be possible to argue the
difficulty of determining reality since it is not as much a question of a
factual situation as it is a legal one, that is, the existence of a "State,"
a "government" or a "border." However, the difference is smaller than
it appears when, after defining these concepts, it is possible to determine
that the situation meets the conditions specified in the definition. More-
over, in these matters actuality is an objective phenomenon. The exist-
ence of the Democratic Republic of Germany or the Democratic Re-
public of Korea, or even the government of Mao in mainland China,
are facts which are uncontested.
2. Recognition of the false
The phenomenon is all the more striking when one notes that the
states consider as existing that which is not, or that which is no longer
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existing or that which has yet to come into existence. There are many
examples of instances where recognition is maintained for fallen states,
for their diplomats, or for treaties signed by them; certain states main-
tained their recognition of the Baltic States well into the 1960's.
Chiang Kai Shek's government's pretense of representing the conti-
nent of China in the United Nations, supported by western allies, was
a real challenge to reality as well as a scandalous situation which lasted
until October 1971, twenty-two years after Mao Tse Tung effectively
took power over the entire continent of China. Among other classic
examples of fictions of this sort are the Vatican and the independent
State of Congo (1885-1908).
From 1870, following Italy's conquest of the Pontifical States, the
Pontiff lost all temporal power, although the Law of Guarantee of May
13, 1871 granted him various privileges. The Lateran Agreements of
February I1, 1929, changed this status by creating the Vatican State.
Legal scholars almost unanimously call it a fiction, for the special fac-
tual conditions which define it a state cannot be isolated under territory
(about 110 acres) and a population of some 500 having nationality
ratione muneris. The Italian legal system, both executive and legislative,
generally is applied in the Vatican.
It is possible to discuss at length the need for or the suitability of
availing oneself of this fiction, or the obsession with the concept of a
territorial grant given to remove the Pontiff from all national sover-
eignty, since other ways could no doubt, have been found which would
have been more appropriate, such as an international organization.
Nevertheless, Italy as well as many foreign States hold the Vatican to
be a State.
The facts concerning the independent State of Congo during the years
1885 to 1908 are well known. The International Association of the
Congo was created in 1884 by Leopold II, King of Belgium, in order to
administer the territories which were discovered in the Congo. In 1884,
and during the International Conference concluded on February 26,
1885 with the General Acts of Berlin, the Association obtained the right
to create an independent State of Congo, neutral and open to trade with
all the States.
The first fiction, as regards the "international" character of that state
quickly vanished when the one who had organized everything backstage
appeared on the scene at the right moment as the head of the new state.
It was, moreover, an open secret. A Resolution of the Belgian Houses
of Parliament of April 28 and 30, 1885 personally authorized Leopold
II to be the head of the State of Congo.
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The second fiction, the one concerning Congo's independence, be-
came patent very quickly. The Prime Minister Beernaert declared the
following before the House:
The country does not have to fear the military and financial costs
which ordinarily are attendant to the establishment of a colony. This
is not a case of flying a Belgian flag in Africa. An independent State
is being formed and the King intends to rule the international Colony,
of which he will be the head, with the resources and forces belonging
strictly to the new State. 4
On April 28, he again stated:
A personal union leaves the two States absolutely separate and abso-
lutely independent; they have nothing in common either from the mili-
tary, financial or diplomatic points of view.2"
As we note, the colonial character of this undertaking was expressed
shamelessly and the only aspect from which Belgium retreated was
calling itself owner of the colony, not for any moral reasons since there
were none at that time, but because of its parochialism and greed.
The attitude of the Belgians was bound to evolve, but in the meantime
the Belgians took charge of the administration of the colony, whose
central government was in Brussels. As Gohzland recalls, in certain
ministries the signs on the doors read "Ring twice for the Congo.""
Belgian capitalism would not allow this magnificent opportunity to es-
cape. In 1889, King Leopold II announced that in his Last Will and
Testament he was leaving the Congo to Belgium. In 1883 the Belgian
Constitution was revised in order to permit Belgium to acquire colonies,
and in 1908 the Belgian Parliament accepted to proceed with the annex-
ation of the Colony. This was the final renunciation of the fiction and
the colonial character of Belgium over the territory was officially recog-
nized.
The status of both Byelorussia and Ukraine, implicitly recognized as
states by the United Nations Charter and the Conventions creating the
specialized agencies, is also a fiction in the sense that, even if they are
Federated States of the U.S.S.R. having international capacity by virtue
of the Constitution of the U.S.S.R., they are not independent states.
The actual motive behind according them such status, however nominal,
was to give a plurality of votes to the U.S.S.R.
"p. VAN ZUYLEN, L'ECHIGUIER CONGOLAIS OU LE SECRET DU Rot 132 (1959).
25Id. at 133.
2 A Ghozland, La fiction en droit international, 1921 at 92 (unpublished thesis in Librairie
generale de droit et de jurisprudence, Paris).
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Other fictive States frequently cited in the legal doctrine are Manchu-
k uo (1931-1945), Slovakia (1940-1945) and the Philippines (1943-1945),
which were created by Japan or the Third Reich out of independent
states (China and Czechoslovakia), or were created from a United
States dependency. In such instances the absence independence resulted
from the absence of effective existence or of real autonomy.
By analogy, the socialist states and some of the states of the third
world considered South Vietnam as d purely fictive state, artificially
created by France and continuing to exist by the grace and support of
the United States. Here we come to another problem raised by the
consequences which must be drawn from reality while the latter is the
result of an illegality.
In international law, the refusal to recognize the consequences of
reality or the existence of a situation may be explained by the illegal
nature of the particular situation. In this event, the rejection of reality
is not the result of an arbitrary characterization by some, but an obliga-
tion not to recognize an illegal situation.
Thus, in the case of Katanga, the Security Council in its Resolution
169 of November 24, 1961, deplored "the secessionist activities and the
military action now being carried on by the provincial administration
of Katanga with the aid of external resources and foreign mercenaries."
The Council completely rejected the claim that Katanga was "a sover-
eign and independent nation." Any other position would have been
tantamount to a premature recognition, consisting of an intervention in
the internal affairs of the Congo.
The obligation on the part of the members of the U.N. not to recog-
nize situations established by force was again brought up recently by the
Security Council in connection with Israeli victories during the Six-Day
War, in particular regarding the illegal occupation of Jerusalem. The
obligation not to recognize situations which are contrary to the right of
people to govern themselves was also brought up by a decision of the
Security Council requesting the States "not to recognize the illegal
racist minority government of Southern Rhodesia," or to recognize as
illegal South Africa's presence in Namibia. Such proceeding, i.e. non-
recognition, is the only available sanction in the world today, in view
of the lack of more effective means (such as economic or military) which
are not feasible or whose effectiveness is limited because of the attitudes
of the states which should exercise them.
On the basis of the preceding principles, it is possible to justify main-
taining the recognition of governments in exile when their removal is
occasioned by an illegality, for example, the German occupation of
countries during World War II.
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We do not believe that one should confuse fiction and the practical
impossibility of applying a determined legal order to a given situation.
Thus, in its Resolution 2145 (XXI) of October 27, 1966, the General
Assembly of the U.N. decided to revoke the mandate of South Africa
over South-West Africa, to delegate the administration to the U.N. and
to rename the territory Namibia. The fact that South Africa has not to
date acceded to this decision does not give the latter a fictive character.
The case of the Status of Jerusalem combines the two effects which
were just examined. Before Israel's attack in 1967, the majority of the
member states of the U.N. refused to accept the factual status of 1948
under which Jerusalem was occupied in part by the Israelis (New City)
and in part by the Jordanians (Old City), as opposed to the U.N. Gen-
eral Assembly's partition plan, which provided international status
(Corpus Separatum) for the city of Jerusalem and the neighboring holy
places, a status which was never effected.
Note in this connection the declarations of Pierre Harmel, Belgian
Minister of Foreign Affairs, on January 27, 1971:
I would like to remind the Senate that Belgium remains faithful to the
Decision of November 29, 1947, of the United Nations General As-
sembly, which provided an international territory for Jerusalem
Corpus Separatum. Thus, the principal nations of the West maintain
general consuls in Jerusalem. In respect of the principle of Corpus
Separatum, exequatur will not be requested either from the Israelis or
from the Jordanians. 27
B. Fictions resulting from the fact that the States do not dare to state
the truth or recognize the truth. The false characterization is used for
reasons of courtesy or hypocrisy in order to hide the truth.
Colonial and imperialist powers have utilized that type of fiction with
extraordinary regularity, in order to give an aura of respectability to
their acts of plunder; humanitarian concerns, whether actual or as-
sumed, were in the forefront. The powers claimed that their acts were
to "bring up peaceful civilization in the general interests of mankind and
for the sake of international trade." Everything which in legal vocabu-
lary could have revealed less noble aspirations was veiled by various
notions which will be considered below.
One should not think that such criticisms are easy to make a
posteriori. The fact is that enlightened individuals of the day, whose
teachings were carefully rejected by classical and bourgeois scholars,
2See Salmon, Occupation Militaire, 9 REVUE BELGE DE DROIT INTERNATIONALE 265 (1973).
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denounced these fictions. They simplify our task today. 8
1. Occupation of territories without rulers
The traditional doctrine taught that states could acquire sovereignty
over a region not under the control of any other state so long as the
occupation of such regions consisted of actual possession with the inten-
tion of subjecting it to its sovereignty. The region in question was termed
nullius territory or res nullius, or territory without a ruler.
In practice such territories included not only uninhabited regions, but
also those with non-western civilizations whose military powers were
either insufficient for any effective defense measures of were entirely
lacking. "Without a ruler" was extended to mean "without a western
ruler," and only a few solidly established states could maintain their
integrity, such as China, Japan, Persia and Siam.
The reply to those who maintained that subjugated people had sover-
eignty was:
It is an exaggeration to speak of sovereignty of savages or semi-
barbaric people. It is a historical contradiction to claim that interna-
tional law subjects the validity of an occupation to a transfer of sover-
eignty. A treaty of transfer can be made only by the States that recog-
nize international law.
Certainly, the occupation of a territory inhabited by savages will
often contain misunderstandings with native leaders. Violence with
regard to inferior peoples should be condemned. One could not even
strictly say that they are outside the community of jus gentium. How-
ever, they are not members of that community. International law does
not recognize the rights of independent tribes.29
By refusing to grant these people the characteristics of a state, it was
arbitrarily decided that their territory had no ruler. One need not em-
phasize the underlying racism of this so-called humanism.
2. Fictive occupation
In their humanistic and civilizing enthusiasm, the powers developed
a habit of declaring occupied territories which had not been subjected
to a factual occupation. The fictional nature of such occupation was
immediately denounced by competing powers and the device was
2 in particular: De Pouvourville, Lesfictions internationales en Extri'me-Orient, REVUE GtNItR-
ALE DE DROIT INTERNATIONALE PUBLIC at 113-25 (1899); L. GERARD, LES CESSIONS DtGUIStES DE
TERRITOIRES EN DROIT INTERNATIONALE PUBLIC (1904); Perrinjaquet, Des annexions dbguis&es de
terri-toire, REVUE GfN9RALE DE DROIT INTERNATIONALE PUBLIC 316 (1909).
"Report of M. de Martitz, ANNUAIRE DE L'INSTITUT DE DEOIT INTERNATIONAL (ed. abr6gee)
II at 433.
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banned by Chapter VI of the General Act of the Berlin Conference of
February 26, 1885, following which this practice ceased once and for all.
Instead, notification to third parties of the occupations and protect-
orates (art. 34) as well as "the existence of sufficient power to defend
the acquired rights and, if necessary, freedom of commerce and tran-
sit," were required (art. 35).
3. International protectorates
The Dichtionaire de la terminologie du droit internationale defines
international protectorates as:
Union of two States, generally established by treaty, whereby the pro-
tected State, while maintaining its characteristic of a State, obtains a
commitment from the protecting State that the latter will defend it
against certain dangers, either internal or external, without reciprocity,
and the protecting State will exercise certain powers, particularly with
regard to foreign matters, and to assume corresponding responsibili-
ties, such powers and responsibilities having been heretofore exercised
by the protected State.
In most instances, the true relationship has been less noble and with-
out the equality implied in the notion. Perrinjaquet wrote:
[T]he protected state is generally weak and disorganized both militar-
ily and financially, a prey to internal anarchy, while the protector is a
great military power; we see how the mask of a protectorate is but a
vain disguise, and that behind the veil of a false association the pro-
tected State is legally and factually at the mercy of the
protector .... 30
The French Protectorates of Cambodia, Annam, Tahiti and Madagas-
car ended by becoming true colonial annexations. The Protectorates of
Tunisia and Morocco left merely a nominal sovereignty to the Bey and
the Sultan. The Japanese Protectorate of Korea and the British Protec-
torate of Transvaal also ended in annexations.
Under the protectorate system, the protected people are not denied
the characteristics of a state, but such people are forced to accept the
"protection," while it is loudly proclaimed that the initiative comes
from them. The consent of the protected as well as the substance of the
relationship is purely fictional, and the latter amounts to political domi-
nation and economic exploitation rather than protection. Thus, many
problems arose with regard to the practical application of the concept
of representation.
aPerrinjaquet, Des annexions dbguisbes territoire, REVUE GtNIRALE DE DROIT INTERNATIONALE
316, 324 (1909).
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Regarding pseudo-protectorates, or colonialized protectorates, the
situation was similar even though the particular territories were less
developed politically by the standards of western nations. In fact, the
system was no less artifically imposed even when their management was
not tainted with impropriety. Ghozland severely criticizes their usage:
Thus, because they are not concluded with real States; because they
completely convey the sovereign rights; because their aim is to transfer
the rights which do not exist and even those about which the transferee
has no knowledge; because they are tainted with theft, error, violence
or injury; because they are signed by other than those who legitimately
have power, these conventions are not real treaties establishing protec-
torates and have no legal value as contractual agreements .3
The German colonies in Africa and the French settlement in Da-
homey are two examples of this approach.
4. The transfer of administration or lease of territories
These two expressions taken from the private law of contracts sound
familiar and harmless. In fact, they apply to situations wherein the
sovereignty of the transferring state, far from being preserved, is most
often permanently affected. From the beginning of this century legal
doctrine exposed the fictional nature of transfers of administration and
territorial leases,32 such as the transfer of administration by the Otto-
man Empire of the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina to Austria (Treaty
of Berlin of April 21, 1879), and of Cyprus to Great Britain (Conven-
tions of June 4 and July 1, 1878).
As to leases, their perpetual or quasi-perpetual nature (99 years and
renewable) made them at the time tantamount to disguised annexations.
This was the case of transfers of leases in China, Africa (reciprocal
leases between Great Britain and the independent State of the Congo),
Panama (Canal Zone), Cuba (Guantanamo), the Philippines, etc.
De Pouvourville analyzed this legal technique and diplomatic method
in the following manner:
It preserves the self-respect of the party that is stripped; it does not
give the impression to, nor does it legally, transfer the sovereignty; it
preserves the self-respect and respectability of the appropriating party
since the larceny is infected by the flow of a long period of time."3
3 A Ghozland, La Fiction en droit internationale, 1921 at 129 (unpublished thesis, Librairie
gen6rale de droit et de jurisprudence, Paris).
1Cf. supra, note 28.
"'De Pouvourville, Les fiction internationales en Extreme-Orient, REVUE GtNtRALE DE DROIT
INTERNATIONALE PUBLIC at 118 (1899).
19741
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
Summarizing all the preceding methods, De Pouvourville concluded
that they were:
[H]ypocritical since they do not respond to the needs nor to the reason-
able desires of those who use the methods but they are all arbitrary
inasmuch as the powers that profit from the relationship disguise their
arbitrariness with pretexts which are often specious and occasionally
openly false, while maintaining their prestige of intellectual and civi-
lized superiority."
5. Mandates, trusteeships, dependent territories
The situation did not improve either with the League of Nations or
with the United Nations, at least at the beginning of the latter's exist-
ence.
The Mandates of the League of Nations, in spite of the term being
borrowed from continental private law, bore no resemblance to the
original concept since the term presumes legal equality of the partners,
and this was not the case with the Mandates. Mandates which were
supposedly accorded to moderators by the League were in fact deter-
mined by the Allies who presented the League with a fait accompli. The
"sacred mission of civilization" did not hide the chatsguised colonies of
Mandates A and B and the desire nex by the holders of Mandate C
(South Africa with regard to the South West Africa). Those who might
labor under a false impression had only to note that the territories
belonging to the vanquished states (the Ottoman Empire and Germany)
were placed under date. Colonies belonging to France, England, Bel-
gium or Holland were exempt from the "sacred mission of civilization"
and the open door policy.
The concept of trusteeship was developed by the authors of the
Charter who searched for a new label for mandates without. changing
the contents of the bottle. The concept of representation which is at the
base of this institution under private law is just as inadequate as it was
for the mandate. Paternalism, indeed racism, so, implicit in the concept
was, no doubt, better suited to the sociological realities than the concept
under the League of Nations.
Here, once again, there was no question of placing under trusteeship
the colonies which were legally baptised in the Charter as "independent
territories." In spite of the inducements in the provisions of the Charter,
no administrating state put a single dependent territory under trustee-
ship. One of the differences between the two systems was the control of
the Trusteeship Council which they did not want to abolish. Instead, the
'lid. at 116.
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United Nations had to struggle against an opposite phenomenon: the
comparison of trusteeships to dependent territories, notably by the ad-
ministrative unions.
In order to avoid the dangers of having certain colonies strive towards
independence, colonial states tried to camouflage to the maximum their
analogous character by baptising them their "overseas territories," or
provinces, or overseas departments (for example, Algeria and the Portu-
guese colonies in Africa). Any suggestion of independence for these
territories or even for them to be preoccupied with the thought of it was
seen as a challenge to the territorial integrity of the administrating state,
or as meddling in its internal affairs so as to foment secession or civil
war!
6. Solicited humanitarian or fraternal intervention
Interventions hold a privileged position as far as fictions are con-
cerned. Officially, they are more often "solicited" and therefore elimi-
nate the need for justification by the intervening party with regard to
third parties or its own public opinion. In 1876 Gustave Rolin-
Jacquemin wrote the following concerning the French intervention in
Lebanon:
Above all concerned with preserving appearances and traditions, the
diplomacy again resorted to the legal fiction at the Sultan's initiative,
just as it did in 1856!"5
With regard to the British intervention in Egypt in 1882 and other
permanent interventions, Perrinjacquet stated:
Under the pretext of maintaining order in a country troubled with
internal disorders or revolutions, of protecting its nationals against the
insecurities and of remedying the impotence of local authorities, one
occupies the country and returns justice to it and little by little one
substitutes one's authority for that of the local, while loudly proclaim-
ing that one has no intentions of conquest, that one is merely exercising
temporary action which is indispensable to the general welfare of civili-
zation and humanity.3 6
A hundred years later the same fiction with regard to solicited inter-
ventions was employed in the case of Hungary and Vietnam.
The Belgian intervention in Stanleyville in 1956 was justified by say-
"Rolin-Jacquemin, Le droit internationale at la phase actuelle de la question d"Orient, REVUE
DE DROIT INTERNATIONALE ET DE DROIT COMPARE 326 (1876).
36Perrinjaquet, Des annexions deguisees de territoire, REVUE GINERALE DE DROIT INTERNATION-
ALE PUBLIC at 332, 339.
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ing it was "solicited." A total of 54 white hostages were "freed from
the clutches of the rebels" at the cost of 2000 Africans killed, and the
rebellion was put to an end.
The United States, likewise, intervened in Santo Domingo to rescue
500 American citizens. From what? The answer to that questions is still
a mystery and there was then not even the pretext of hostages. Neverthe-
less, 30,000 marines were rushed there and remained for three months
with a very satisfactory result -Juan Bosch, Camano and other constitu-
tionalists were in no danger of losing power!
The intervention by the U.S.S.R. and certain other COMECON
countries in Czeckoslovakia for "fraternal" purposes convinced no one,
including other Communist states or parties.
C. Fictions arising out of theories established by legal doctrine and
legal formalism. False characterizations are used in order to systema-
tize, rationalize or to organize. The fiction's purpose is to justify reality
for the benefit of special class interests.
This section deals with fictions in legal doctrine and legal formalism.
The doctrine which partakes of the ideology of a system creates an even
more powerful set of fictions which, in the final analysis, do more
spiritual harm than does the doctrine itself to the virtues of intellectual
and scientific spirit and objectivity. The doctrine asserts its freedom
from politics and claims only to serve the law although the law which it
espouses is but the expression of a conservative policy and its idealism
and humanism benefit only the interests of imperialist powers.
This is true of all concepts which liken a state to a subordinate power
in relation to a world power or a world order, such as the concept of
"World State," when used to explain international organizations or the
end to which an application of international law would lead, or the
concept of "jurisdiction," when used to explain a state's powers. Simi-
larly, analogies drawn from constitutional law such as "executive",
"legislative" and "judicial" powers are all fictions when applied to inter-
national law. Since the latter has nothing in common with a domestic
legal system, such fictions serve only to express their author's philoso-
phies of history.
The same is true for all theories which impart a federal pattern to
international organizations. This does not mean that all the concepts of
federal law used in explaining certain mechanisms of the law of interna-
tional organizations are unwelcome-merely that it should not go be-
yond this point and their use should be exercised with care. Thus, the
concept of "supranationality" has wrought considerable harm to the law
of the European communities. Much has been written to advance this
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concept in spite of the realities and the terms of the Treaty of Rome.
What more can be said of the famous George Scelle's "dedoublement
fonctionnel?"
Professor Bourquin criticized the proposed plans to give the United
Nations enlarged "capacities" and to visualize it as a Superstate. He
stated:
In the plans which significantly increase the powers of the U.N., one
often forgets to take into account that these powers would not be
accorded to a homogeneous body which would be concerned only with
the common interests of international society but to an association of
States, each one guided principally by national imperatives and en-
deavoring to utilize the resources of this Organization for its own
political ends. Legally, the power of the Organization would be en-
larged and hence the power of the community which it represents. But,
herein lies the fiction. Since the decisions of the Organization are taken
by a majority vote, the principal beneficiaries of the change would be
the majorities, or more precisely, the powers around which such major-
ities crystallize. In our world which is deeply divided, this would
amount to handing over a highly dangerous weapon to the Powers.
This situation could lead to the demise of the Organization rather than
strengthening it. 7
Professor Tunkin uses much stronger terms in decrying this move:
Under present conditions, plans for the creation of a World-State calls
to abolish State sovereignty and objectively reflects the tendencies of
the imperialist Powers to use international organizations for their own
reactionary purposes. Any lessening of importance of State's sover-
eignty at present only facilitates the intervention of the great imperial-
ist Powers in the domestic affairs of the weaker States for the purpose
of repressing the liberation movement and the continuation of the
economic and political subjugation of the people.3 8
In the same vein, Professor Chaumont warned that:
The jurists who exclaim their wish for a system with international
authority endowed with executive powers either forget the disparities
which make it impossible to have a world government for a very long
time, or are prepared to accept the dictates of a Great Power or a
foreign State.3 9
The concept of an international "society" or "community" arouses
3
TBoURGUIN, L'ETAT SOUVERAIN ET L'ORGANISATION INTERNATIONALE 32 (1959).
"ITANKIN, DROIT INTERNATIONALE PUBLIC, PROBLtMES THEORIGUES 152 (1965).
3'Chaumont, Cours g'g'ral de droit internationale public 129 RECUEIL DES COURS DE LA HAYE
332, 366 (1970).
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the same kind of reservations. What is this mythical being from which
emanates a universal law valid for everyone when every day realities
reveal so many divergent currents and deep contradictions and differ-
ences within the so-called "international community?"
Professor Chaumont further states:
Where does one factually find the will for an "international com-
munity," the nature or dimensions of whice cannot grasp? Is there not
a confusion between interest and desire. For R. Aron (PEACE AND
WAR AMONG NATIONS -p. 705 et. seq.), the desire for an "international
community" exists only in the minds of certain theoreticians. 0
The same author further decries the delusion of an international so-
ciety which would give rise to, as well as be regulated by, international
law as follows:
Concepts as general and disembodied as those of solidarity and coop-
eration, no doubt, express part of the reality but are much loftier than
reality when used abstractly and independently of specific cases of
agreement. Historical analysis will prove that such concepts are a bad
cover-up for violence, injustice and exploitation which characterizes
the evolution of the "international society.''
In asking us to reflect upon classical international law, Professor
Chaumont shows that the entire legal doctrine proves to be an accumu-
lation of fiction. Classical international law is "the formalization of
situations of predominance of the strong over the weak." Legal formal-
ism is:
[T]he state of international law marked by the triumph of appearance
over reality, determination of rules without taking into account con-
crete situations in terms of the creation and application of the rules,
as well as the framework of the States and the international relations
in question. It is a combination of cynicism and illusion ...42
Legal formalism may lead to the making of law as an end in itself;
law for the sake of law, while forgetting that the law may not be
separated from reality to which it applies, without guaranteeing these
realities. It is the reason why classical international law, just because
of what it harbors and justifies, is unreal because of what it stabilizes
and ignores."
In adopting Professor Chaumont's view-as we do-huge sections of
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cannot withstand the test of reality. The same holds true for all the
concepts of classical international law which are based on the concepts
of liberty and equality.
For example, consider the freedom to contract. Where is there the
freedom to make contracts between a weak state economically or mili-
tarily dominated by a powerful state? Very slight, if one judges the harsh
pressure applied at the Vienna Conference on the Law of Treaties by
the western powers and their allies to obtain the adoption of the princi-
ple that only in the case of threat or use of force (i.e., armed-coercion),
as distinguished from an economic coercion, could a treaty be null and
void.
Another example is found in the freedom of the seas. Who profits by
this freedom, if not those who possess the means which are indispensable
to use it and exploit it? That is to say, the powerful or capitalist powers.
The new principle, according to which "the sea-bed is the common
property of humanity," will it also not end up by being exploited by the
Super Powers and the multinational companies?
The principle of equality among nations covers another set of fictions
traditionally acknowledged by the expression that there is "a difference
between equality in fact and equality in law." A more popular quip is,
"[a]ll states are legally equal but some are more equal than others."
All the legal rules which place the developed and the developing
nations on an equal legal footing in the economic area, in fact, give an
advantage to the former. This could be termed "unequal reciprocity"
since it always turns in favor of the industrial powers.
What then could be said about the delusion of "aid to developing
nations?" It has now been amply proven that in reality aid hides the
framework for domination; quantitatively, it amounts to less than the
revenues realized by developed countries from the third-world countries
and it maintains, if not aggravates, underdevelopment.
Finally, one should even dare to put into question the concepts of
"sovereignty" or "independence" of a large number of states in a system
of international relations which continues to be dominated and exploited
by the strong.
The jurist, either practitioner or scholar, appears therefore, to carry
a tremendous burden of responsibility in using the law as a means of
perpetuating domination and exploitation. His traditional pretense of
being objective and apolitical is also shown to be completely lacking in
substance.
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